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Abstract
This  paper  describes  a safety assessment  study of the Minimum Safety Altitude Warning 
system (MSAW) using resilience engineering principles. The purpose of the MSAW system 
is  to  alert  Air  Traffic  Controller  (ATCO) of  potential  Controlled  Flight  Into  Terrain  and 
Controlled Flight Into Obstacles with sufficient warning time for appropriate instructions to 
be  issued to  pilot.  The first  step of  the  safety  assessment  is  to  identify  and describe  the 
MSAW functions  by means of the Functional  Resonance Analysis  Method (FRAM). The 
impact  of  the  introduction  of  MSAW in  the  Air  Traffic  Management  (ATM)  system  is 
evaluated by incorporating the MSAW functions into an existing FRAM model of ATCO 
activities.  The  resulting  FRAM model  is  then  used  to  evaluate  two scenarios  to  identify 
possible risks emerging from the introduction of MSAW. Risk identification is based on the 
evaluation  of  functions’  performance  variability  and  on  the  occurrence  of  unexpected 
combinations. The advantages of this approach are discussed in the conclusion of the paper. 
Introduction 
The introduction in the Air Traffic Management system of a safety net device such as the 
Minimum  Safety  Altitude  Warning  system  (MSAW),  must  be  preceded  by  a  safety 
assessment. The MSAW has been here used as case study for the application of the Functional 
Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) to identify emergent risks due to the combination of 
variability of normal performance. A detailed description of the FRAM can be found in, e.g., 
Hollnagel (2004), Woltjer et al. (2007), or Macchi et al. (2008). 
The  Deutsche  Flugsicherung  (DFS)  MSAW System requirements  document  (Version  2.1 
issued 11.01.2007) states that MSAW is a safety function that “under normal circumstances, 
allows the ATCO to conduct his  tasks with MSAW operating in the background and not 
disturbing  ATC  process.”  MSAW,  being  normally  transparent  to  the  controller,  has  the 
objective to prevent a “serious situation from developing into a catastrophic one in case of 
loss of terrain awareness.” In more detail,  MSAW has the objective to alert  ATCOs of a 
potential Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) and Controlled Flight Into Obstacle (CFIO) 
and serious approach path deviations. Alerts have to be provided with sufficient time to allow 
ATCOs to respond.
The MSAW has the functionality to monitor:
1. General Terrain;
2. Minimum Radar Vectoring Altitudes;
3. Approach Path. 
This paper describes the safety assessment of the Approach Path Monitoring functionality of 
MSAW.  This  functionality  must  alert  ATCO  in  case  of  an  aircraft  that  deviates,  or  is 
predicted to deviate, from the approach path of a runway.
System functions
In order to perform a safety assessment with FRAM it is necessary to identify and characterise 
MSAW  specific  functions  and  how  they  are  coupled  to  other  ATM  functions  (e.g., 
Monitoring, Planning, etc.). The detailed characterisation of the functions uses the six aspects 
(Input, Output, Preconditions, Resources, Time and Control) defined by the FRAM guidelines 
(Hollnagel, 2004). In the current analysis, the functions were grouped into the three categories 
of ATM functions, MSAW related functions, and Organisational functions. 
ATM functions
The ATM functions represent what the ATM system does to achieve its objective, i.e., assure 
a safe and efficient air traffic flow in a given airspace. Twelve functions (Table 1) have been 
identified in collaboration with Air Traffic Controllers (ATCOs) and safety experts.
Table 1– ATM functions
1 PROVIDE MET DATA
Provide to CWP QNH, wind speed and direction, heavy rain etc.
Technical function performed by IDVS/omega system.
2
PROVIDE FLIGHT & RADAR 
DATA
Provide CWP flights call sing, flight level, aircraft typology, aircraft 
vectoring, route information etc.
Technical function performed by P1/ATCAS system.
3 DISPLAY DATA CWP Display data on Controller Working Position
4 MONITORING
Monitor traffic situation and anticipate traffic development. This func-
tion consists in building and updating a mental picture of traffic situ-
ation, as well as search for potential conflicts.
5 PLANNING Develop a control plan to anticipate conflicts and manage traffic flow.
6 STRIP MARKING Mark the issued clearances on paper or electronic strip
7 COORDINATION
Coordinate with adjacent sectors on desired flights level, vectoring, 
route, airplanes reported problems etc. This function is performed by 
the planning controller to support executive controller activity
8 UPDATE FDPS Update data processing system with respect to issued clearances.
9
PILOT-ATCO 
COMMUNICATION
Communication, initiated by pilots, to establish radio contact or to re-
quest information or clearances to controller
10
SECTOR-SECTOR 
COMMUNICATION
Radio telecommunication between adjacent sectors to initiate the co-
ordination function.
11
ISSUE CLEARANCE TO 
PILOT
Issue clearances to pilots via radio communication system or data 
link.
12 UPDATE MET DATA
Manually update Meteorological data if technical system temporally 
fails and some data are missing
MSAW related functions
In order to evaluate the impact of the MSAW introduction on the ATM system it is necessary 
to  integrate  MSAW related  functions  with  ATM functions.  Based  on  participation  in  the 
official  safety  assessment  workshop  for  MSAW,  as  well  as  several  interactions  with 
controllers, the following four functions have been identified (Table 2). The first function is 
performed by the technical  system that  computes  and generates  alerts  on the base of  the 
predicted aircraft paths and on the implemented logic. The three other functions require the 
intervention  of  humans  to  enable  or  disable  the  transmission  of  alerts  to  the  Controller 
Working  Position  and  define  the  airspace  volumes  and  SSR  codes  for  which  alerts  (if 
calculated) are not transmitted. 
Table 2 – MSAW functions
Organisational functions
The  FRAM assumes  that  performance  variability  to  a  large  extent  is  determined  by  the 
context  or  the  work environment,  and also  that  the context  can  be unstable  or  changing. 
Indeed,  it  is  possible to consider the context  as the outcome of other functions (physical, 
social, organisational, economical, etc.) in the environment where the work takes place, hence 
subject to organisational control. 
To provide the basis for the identification of organisational functions, the set of Common 
Performance Conditions proposed by Hollnagel (1998) was combined with recent research on 
evaluation of safety-critical organisation (Reiman and Oedewald, 2009). An initial list was 
complied and compared against others from the organisational literature (e.g., Reason, 2008; 
Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007; Hopkins; 2008) and then refined for the specific case. The identified 
organisational functions are summarised in Table 3 and shown relative to the corresponding 
Common Performance Condition. 
Table 3 – Mapping CPCs into Organisational functions
Common Performance 
Conditions
Function Description
Availability of resources, number 
of goals and conflict resolution, 
available time 
MANAGE RESOURCES Organizational function: provide and manage 
economical, technical and human resources to 
allow system functioning
Training and experience MANAGE COMPETENCE Organizational function: provide operators with 
required competences and knowledge for system 
operation. This includes technical, safety 
competence and deference to expertise.
Access to procedures and 
methods
MANAGE PROCEDURES Organizational function: design, update, distribute 
procedures to support operational activity
Crew collaboration and quality MANAGE TEAMWORK Organizational function: manage teamwork to 
assure a desired quality in team collaboration
1 GENERATE MSAW ALERT
Generate alerts (General Terrain Monitoring, Approach Path Monit-
oring, Minimum Radar Vectoring Altitude) using predicted aircraft 
paths and MSAW prediction logic. 
2 ENABLE MSAW ALERT
When MSAW is not enabled, the alert generation process continues, 
but alert transmission will be suppressed
3
DEFINE ALERT INHIBIT AIR 
SPACE VOLUMES
Define specified airspace volumes to inhibit the transmission of 
MSAW alerts
4
DEFINE ALERT INHIBIT SSR 
CODES
Define individual or list of SSR codes to inhibit the transmission of 
MSAW alerts. 
Common Performance 
Conditions
Function Description
HMI and operational support, 
conditions of work
MANAGE WORKING 
CONDITIONS 
Organizational function: manage the conditions 
(e.g. HMI, ergonomic aspects, noise, lightening 
etc) in which the work is carried out
The FRAM model
The function identification leads to the FRAM model of the ATM system (Figure 1). The 
model is composed of the three types of functions presented above: 
• ATM functions, 
• Organisational functions (thick lined functions in the figure) and 
• MSAW functions (in grey in the figure). 
Notice that the functions in the model are not linked  a priori. The links between them are 
generated according to the analysed scenario.  The following describes a scenario that was 
developed to demonstrate the safety assessment. A set of instantiations (i.e., the way in which 
functions  are  coupled  under  given  conditions)  of  the  model  is  then  presented.  The 
instantiations, together with the evaluation of the performance variability, are the basis for the 
risk identification.
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Figure 1 – The FRAM model of the socio-technical system
Approach landing scenario 
The scenario used to assess the introduction of MSAW in the ATM system is a Landing 
approach at the Stuttgart airport (Germany). The airport and air traffic characteristics suggest 
that a scenario with two approaching aircraft is realistic. Interviews and field observations 
performed at DFS control centre in Langen showed how controllers would interact with the 
two flying pilots to direct them towards the Final Approach Fix point in the most efficient 
way. The following clearances will be issued:
1. Aircraft  #1 identified,  proceed direct  to DLS 512, descend altitude 5000 FT-QNH 
1027
2. Aircraft #2 identified, descend FL60, proceed direct to DLS 512
3. Aircraft #1 descend altitude 4000 FT, turn right heading 230, cleared ILS25
4. Aircraft #2 descend altitude 4000 FT-QNH 1027, turn left heading 210, cleared ILS25
5. Aircraft #1 contact tower
6. Aircraft #2 contact tower
Figure  2 shows the  arrival  chart  of  Stuttgart  airport  and  the  paths  aircraft  would  follow 
according to issued clearances (dotted lines). 
Stuttgart 
airport
Aircraft #1
Aircraft #2
DLS 512
Final 
Approach
Fix point
Figure 2- Approach landing scenario at Stuttgart airport
Evaluation of variability of normal performance 
In the FRAM, the identification of risks is based on the evaluation of the variability of normal 
performance  and  in  its  potential  non-linear  combination  (so  called  functional  resonance 
effect).  It is therefore necessary first to assess performance variability. To begin with it is 
recognised that the functions of a socio-technical system have different characteristics that 
conveniently may be described by one of the three MTO categories: Human (M), Technology 
(T), and Organisation (O). These three categories describe functions of a different nature and 
with characteristic differences in performance variability. 
• Human functions  will  typically  be quite  variable  because people must  adjust  their 
performance to current working conditions (resources and demands, cf.,  Hollnagel, 
2009).  Human  performance  can  vary  on  a  short  term basis,  but  may  also  have  a 
dampening effect. 
• Technological  functions that  depend mainly on the technology implemented in the 
system are in less subject to variability since they are designed to be stable, reliable, 
and predictable. For the purpose of this study the technological functions are assumed 
to be properly designed, implemented and maintained and variability is therefore not 
expected.  Technical  functions,  however,  do  not  have  the  possibility  to  dampen 
performance variability. 
• Organisational functions are subject to a different kind of variability, relative to the 
human functions. The nature or organisational functions makes these less variables 
than human functions – or rather their variability has a delayed effect on the human 
functions.  A typical  example  could  be the production and updating of procedures. 
However, since the aim of this safety assessment was the evaluation of the human 
contribution to system safety, organisational functions were considered stable for the 
scenario. 
The following presents how performance variability for human functions could manifest itself 
(i.e.,  what  the  outputs  of  variable  functions  could  be)  and  proposes  a  rule  to  assess 
performance variability. The application of the rule to the instantiations of the model supports 
the identification of emergent risks. 
Human functions: Assessment of performance variability
The above presented set of organisational functions was introduced to account for the context 
effect on human performance. In this way the model and the method are both composed of 
homogeneous  elements,  namely  functions  and their  aspects.  The advantage  of  this  is  the 
possibility to assess performance variability by using a set of elements that can be described 
in a common way. 
In order to assess performance variability it is necessary to characterise the aspects for all the 
functions. Each aspect could be characterised in terms of the precision and timing with which 
it is produced.
In terms of precision, an aspect can be:
• Precise;
• Acceptable;
• Imprecise.
In terms of time, an aspect can be:
• Too early;
• On-time;
• Too late. 
In FRAM, the output of an upstream function may be used by a downstream function as Input 
or Precondition or Control or Resource. The timing of the output from an upstream function 
may affect  the  available  time for  the downstream functions  to  be performed,  i.e.,  it  may 
increase or decrease temporal pressure, which in turn may have an impact on the precision 
and timing of their output. It is possible to represent the quality of possible outputs combining 
the precision and the timing characteristic as shown in Table 4. 
Table 4- Human functions: output characterisation
Temporal characteristics
Too early On time Too late
Precision
Precise A: Output to down-
stream functions is 
precise but too early
B: Output to down-
stream functions is 
precise with the right 
timing
C: Output to down-
stream functions is 
precise but delayed, 
reducing available 
time
Acceptable D: Output to down-
stream functions is 
acceptable but too 
early
E: Output to down-
stream functions is 
acceptable with the 
right timing
F: Output to down-
stream functions is 
acceptable but 
delayed, reducing 
available time
Imprecise G: Output to down-
stream functions is 
imprecise and too 
early
H: Output to down-
stream functions is 
imprecise but cor-
rectly timed
I: Output to down-
stream functions is 
imprecise as well as 
delayed, reducing 
available time
Table  4  can  be  used  to  assess  the  potential  for  performance  variability  induced  by  the 
combination of all  the incoming aspects  for a given function and consequently  the likely 
quality of its output. The effect on performance variability of the aspects could be presented 
as follow (Figure 3):
DampingIncrease
high
medium
small
medium
high
small
B
E
AD
C
F
G
H
I
Figure 3- Aspect’s quality effect on Performance variability
For the time being a quite simple rule (method) could be proposed:
The median of the quality of the aspects is the quality of the output.
Risks identification results
The risk identification for the scenario is based on a ‘paper and pencil’ simulation. It is used 
to illustrate how the proposed methodology can be applied to a real safety assessment case, 
although such an application certainly will be more intricate. The presented scenario could be 
instantiated  in  the  model  leading  to  a  set  of  sequence  of  instantiations  representing  the 
temporal  development  of  the  scenario.  Note  that  the  analysis  of  the  consequences  of 
performance  variability  is  based  on the  contents  of  the  FRAM model  rather  than  on the 
graphical rendering. The latter can be useful for communication, but is not essential for the 
method as such.
In order to apply the method to the identification of potential emergent risks, a further set of 
assumptions has to be made: 
1. Organisational  functions  produce  precise  outputs,  therefore  the  context  for  Human 
functions performance is acceptable and the organisational functions therefore do not 
induce variability;
2. The MSAW function ‘Generate MSAW alert’ during the scenario triggers an alert (for 
Aircraft  #1)  during  the  development  of  the  scenario.  The  remaining  technological 
functions are properly designed and implemented their outputs are therefore correct 
and no variability is induced;
3. The MSAW function ‘Enable MSAW alert  transmission’ is  performed imprecisely 
(Output characterised as H in Table 4);
4. ‘Issue  clearance  to  pilot’  function  is  performed  earlier  than  expected  when  the 
clearance Aircraft #1 descend altitude 4000 FT, turn right heading 230, cleared ILS2 
is issued (Output characterised as D in Table 4);
5. The remaining functions are performed with acceptable precision and timing (Output 
characterised as E in Table 4).
It  is  now  possible  to  present  the  instantiations,  to  apply  the  methodology,  and  to  draw 
preliminary  conclusions.  In  the diagrams that  follow,  dotted  lines  represent  the output  of 
organisational  functions,  i.e.,  the  context.  Only  relevant  functions  are  represented  in  the 
instantiations.
Landing approach scenario - First instantiation 
The  first  instantiation  (Figure  4)  represents  the  starting  point  for  the  ‘paper  and  pencil’ 
simulation. Due to the above mentioned assumptions, no risks emerge from this instantiation. 
Although  the  inaccurate  enabling  of  MSAW  alert  transmission  introduces  potential 
performance variability in the system, the potential variability is not triggered because there is 
no need of an MSAW alert at the time.
ENABLE 
MSAW 
ALERT
TRANSMI-
SSION
I
P
C
O
R
T
Teamwork
PROVIDE 
MET DATA
I
P
C
O
R
T
DISPLAY 
DATA ON 
CWP
I
P
C
O
R
T
PROVIDE 
FLIGHT & 
RADAR 
DATA
I
P
C
O
R
T
PLANNINGI
P
C
O
R
T
PILOT –
ATCO
COMMUNI-
CATION
I
P
C
O
R
T
FLIGHT & RADAR DATA
SYSTEM MESSAGE
ALERT INHIBIT 
SSR CODES DEFINED
ALERT INHIBIT 
AIRSPACE 
VOL DEFINED
MSAW FUNCTION 
ENABLED
MET DATA
FLIGHT POSITION A/C 2 
MONITORED
FLIGHT POSITION A/C 1
MONITORED
CLEARANCE PLAN A/C 1
CLEARANCE PLAN A/C 2
A/C 1: 
RADIO CONTACT 
ESTABLISHED
A/C 2: 
RADIO CONTACT 
ESTABLISHED
CLEARANCE A/C2: 
Aircraft #2 identified, 
descend FL60, 
proceed direct to DLS 512
Model 
functions
Organisational 
functions
MSAW 
functions
Procedure
Technical training
Procedure
Technical training
Procedure
Procedure
Teamwork
STRIP 
MARKING
I
P
C
O
R
T
Technical training
MONITORINGI
P
C
O
R
T
Technical training
Technical training
FLIGHT & RADAR DATA 
DISPLAYED
MET DATA 
DISPLAYED
SYSTEM MESSAGE
Technical training
ISSUE 
CLEARANCE 
TO PILOT
I
P
C
O
R
T
CLEARANCE A/C 1: 
Aircraft #1 identified, 
proceed direct to DS 512, 
descend altitude 5000FT-QNH 1027
Procedure
MANAGE 
COMPETENCE
I
P
C
O
R
T
MANAGE 
PROCEDURES
I
P
C
O
R
T
MANAGE 
TEAMWORK
I
P
C
O
R
T
GENERATE 
MSAW 
ALERT
I
P
C
O
R
T
DEFINE 
ALERT-
INHIBITED 
AIRSPACE 
VOL.
I
P
C
O
R
T
DEFINE 
ALERT-
INHIBITED 
SRR 
CODES
I
P
C
O
R
T
Figure 4- Scenario – First instantiation
Landing approach scenario- Second instantiation 
The second instantiation for the scenario represents the temporal evolution of the situation. 
After the first instantiation the two aircraft have been instructed to proceed directly towards 
DLS512.  During  this  instantiation,  two additional  clearances  are  issued  to  the  pilots.  As 
assumed, the clearance Aircraft #1 descend altitude 4000 FT, turn right heading 230, cleared 
ILS2 is issued too early (Output D). 
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Figure 5- Scenario - Second instantiation
Landing approach scenario – Third instantiation 
In addition, an alert is calculated but not displayed on CWP (as assumed) since Preconditions 
are not satisfied.
The Monitoring function therefore receives:
• Acceptable precision and correctly timed output from the Provide Met. Data (Output 
E);
• Acceptable precision but premature flight data for A/C #1 (Output D);
• Imprecise but correctly timed data from the MSAW functions (Output H).
Its output therefore is still acceptable but no longer on time (Output F), since it is reasonable 
to consider ATCO will detect the dangerous situation for Aircraft #1 later than if supported by 
MSAW. 
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Figure 6- Scenario - Third instantiation
The  application  of  the  proposed  methodology  to  a  simplified  example  has  shown  the 
possibility  for  identification  of  emergent  risks  due  to  the  interaction  of  the  variability  of 
normal  performance  induced  by  the  ‘Issue  clearance  to  pilot’  and  ‘Enable  MSAW alert 
transmission’  functions.  Given  the  above  assumptions,  this  variability  may  affect  the 
Monitoring function in such a way that that it is performed with acceptable precision but later 
than expected. 
Conclusion
This paper has presented the application of the Functional Resonance Analysis Method to 
perform a  safety  assessment  study for  the  Minimum Safe  Altitude  Warning  system.  The 
introduction of a safety net system in the ATM domain requires the evaluation of its potential 
impact  in  safety  terms.  Adopting  a  resilience  engineering  approach,  the  FRAM  and  the 
proposed  methodology  have  been  applied  to  look  for  risks  due  to  the  combination  of 
variability of normal performance rather than to system failures or breakdowns. The Landing 
approach  scenario  illustrated  how  an  inappropriate  enabling  of  the  alert  transmission  in 
combination with a ‘trivial’ anticipation of a clearance could result in a degraded performance 
of the monitoring function. This result, within the limitations of the example, nevertheless 
shows the added value of a resilience engineering approach when evaluating the potential 
impact of the introduction of new equipments in the ATM domain.
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